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1 Introduction
The Nash model for two-person bargaining pivots on the assumption that agents are expected
utility maximisers. The underlying feasible alternatives are abstracted away by mapping any
proposal into a pair of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities (u1, u2). A Nash bargaining
problem (S, d) consists of a compact and convex set S ⊂ R2 of feasible utility pairs, and a
disagreement point d in S representing the utilities associated with bargaining breakdown.
Moreover, the convexity of S is frequently justified by including lotteries among the feasible
proposals.
A bargaining solution assigns to any Nash problem (S, d) a single pair of utility values
in S. Nash (1950) proved that the unique solution satisfying four axioms is defined as the
maximiser of the product (u1 − d1)(u2 − d2) for (u1, u2) in S and ui ≥ di for i = 1, 2. These
four axioms are usually known as symmetry, Pareto optimality, invariance to positive affine
transformations, and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
The Nash model is a cornerstone of two-person bargaining theory. Its simplicity and
robustness have fostered both its widespread application and its theoretical prominence.
A vast body of literature has adopted it, proposing different axiomatizations for the Nash
solution as well as several alternative solutions; see f.i. Thomson (1994). Along its many
glories, however, not all is well with the model: the Nash solution cannot stake a claim for
being intuitively appealing. Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992) put it very sharply:
“the solution lacks a straightforward interpretation since the meaning of the product of two
von Neumann–Morgenstern utility numbers is unclear”; see Section 4.2.3.
Motivated by this, they review the foundations of the Nash model and offer a very lucid
account of its interpretive limitations. Restating the classical utility-based Nash model in
terms of agents’ preferences, they offer a more attractive definition of the Nash solution. This
conceptual switch to a preference-based language is a key step for reinterpreting the logic
underlying the axioms and the solution. However, while their focus on preferences brings
substantial theoretical insights, it does not yet uncover an intuitive meaning neither for the
product operator nor for the Nash solution.
This paper revisits the Nash model from a related viewpoint. We switch from a utility-
based language to a probability-based language. (Specifically, we dispense with most of
the formalities of expected utility.) This unlocks several theoretical dividends. We offer a
behavioural characterisation for a general class of solutions, equivalent to maximising the
probability that the bargainers strike an agreement. This provides a sound underpinning
for giving prescriptive advice to a mediator. We also characterise a few major solutions as
special cases of this approach, where the single feature separating them is the nature of the
stochastic dependence between the bargainers’ stance.
Our probability-based approach suggests a straightforward interpretation for the product
of two von Neumann–Morgenstern utility numbers advocated by the Nash solution. This
is revealed as the product of two probabilities, and corresponds to an implicit assumption
of stochastic independence between the bargainers’ positions. We then show how relaxing
this assumption generates other well-known but less frequently used alternatives, namely the
egalitarian and the (truncated) utilitarian solutions.
A simple example may be useful to elucidate our interpretation of the Nash solution,
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leaving generalisations and details to the rest of the paper. Two agents are bargaining over
a set A of feasible alternatives, described in physical terms. (The Nash model ignores A and
focus on the space of utilities.) Assume that A is a nonempty, compact and connected subset
of Rn. Each agent i = 1, 2 has an ordinal continuous preference %i over A. The two agents
hire a mediator to suggest a solution and help them strike an agreement. The mediator knows
agents’ ordinal preferences, but she is not sure what it takes for an agent to accept a proposal
x from A.
More formally, we postulate that i accepts a proposal x if and only if x %i ti, where ti in A
is i’s acceptance threshold (for short, his target). The mediator has incomplete information
about the bargainers’ targets: she believes that each target is a random variable Ti, with
a compact and convex support in A. Under her beliefs, she maps each proposal x to a
pair of individual acceptance probabilities (p1, p2) in [0, 1]
2, where pi = P (x %i Ti). If the
bargainers’ targets are stochastically independent, the probability that both accept x is given
by the product p1 · p2 of the individual acceptance probabilities.
The mediator can recommend any feasible alternative, but she cannot impose it: if she
suggests x, it is left to the bargainers to accept it. Her goal is to find a proposal x that max-
imises the probability that agents strike an agreement. Assuming that targets are stochasti-
cally independent, she should advance a proposal x that maximises the product p1 ·p2. Hence,
the Nash solution may be interpreted as the rule that recommends to maximise the proba-
bility to strike an agreement when agents’ targets are private information and independently
distributed.
This is not merely an analogy. Section 4.2.2 shows that the distribution function P (x %i
Ti) for Ti is formally equivalent to the Bernoulli index function Ui(x) and thus we can set
P (x %i Ti) = Ui(x). The Nash solution requires to maximise the product of two numbers, and
they can be equivalently interpreted as utilities or probabilities. The existing axiomatizations
are framed in a utility-based language for which the product operator is a puzzle. Switching
to a probability-based language uncovers a straightforward interpretation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides preliminary information
on bivariate copulas. Section 3 describes our model, offers a general characterisation for
preferences over bargaining solutions, as well as an axiomatization for the Nash solution,
the egalitarian solution, and the (truncated) utilitarian solution. Section 4 reviews related
literature, and offers a commentary on our results. Section 5 illustrates applications and
extensions, as well as some testable restrictions on the model.
2 Preliminaries
Copulas are functions that link multivariate distributions to their one-dimensional marginal
distributions; see Nelsen (2006). They are used to model different forms of statistical depen-
dence and construct families of distributions exhibiting them. We focus on the prominent
case of bivariate copulas.
A (bivariate) copula is a function C : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] that satisfies two properties:
C1) for any p, q in [0, 1], C(p, 0) = C(0, q) = 0, C(p, 1) = p, and C(1, q) = q;
C2) for any p1 > q1 and p2 > q2 in [0, 1], C(p1, p2) + C(q1, q2) ≥ C(p1, q2) + C(q1, p2).
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Property C2 is usually called 2-increasingness in the literature, but is of course equivalent
to supermodularity. We use this latter name because it is presumably more familiar for our
readers. The combination of C1 and C2 implies that C(p, q) is increasing in each argument;
see Lemma 2.1.4 in Nelsen (2006). When the weak inequality in C2 is replaced by a strict
one, the copula C is said to be strictly supermodular and it is strictly increasing in each
argument.
The following result is in Sklar (1959) and characterizes how a copula links the bivariate
distribution to its univariate marginals.
Theorem 1. Let (X,Y ) be a random vector with marginal distributions F (x) and G(y). The
following are equivalent:
i) H(x, y) is the joint distribution function of (X,Y );
ii) there exists a copula C(p, q) such that H(x, y) = C[F (x), G(y)] for all x, y.
If F (x) and G(y) are continuous, then C(p, q) is unique. Otherwise, C(p, q) is uniquely
defined on the cartesian product Ran(F ) × Ran(G) of the ranges of the two marginal dis-
tributions. Conversely, if C(p, q) is a copula and F (x) and G(y) are distribution functions,
then the function H(x, y) defined above is a joint distribution function with margins F (x)
and G(y).
The best known example of a copula is the product Π(p, q) = p · q, associated with
stochastic independence. Two other important examples are W (p, q) = max(p + q − 1, 0)
and M(p, q) = min(p, q). For any copula C(p, q) and any (p, q) in [0, 1]2, it is the case that
W (p, q) ≤ C(p, q) ≤ M(p, q). Intuitively, M is the copula associated with the strongest
possible positive dependence between X and Y , given the marginal distributions F and G;
similarly, W describes the strongest possible negative dependence. The copulas W and M
are known as the Fre´chet lower and upper bound, respectively.
3 Model and results
In its simplest version, our model for two-person bargaining is as abstract as the Nash model.
We postulate that each feasible proposal x is mapped to a pair of probabilities (p1, p2). At
this stage, it suffices to think of pi as the individual acceptance probability that a third-party
called the mediator attributes to Agent i = 1, 2 when he is offered the proposal x. Section 4.2
discusses two compatible interpretations for this mapping.
For our purposes, a bargaining problem is represented by a compact set B in [0, 1]2 where
each point p in B corresponds to a pair of (acceptance) probabilities. A solution is a map
that for any problem B delivers (at least) one point in B.
We consider the preferences of the mediator over the set of lotteries on pairs of acceptance
probabilities, and derive a behavioural characterisation under which she evaluates a proposal
by the probability that both bargainers agree to it. More formally, we assume that the
mediator has a preference relation % on the lotteries on [0, 1]2, and provide a representation
theorem under which the solution for B corresponds to a %–maximal point in B.
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3.1 Assumptions on preferences
We denote an element (p1, p2) in [0, 1]
2 by p. We view [0, 1]2 as a mixture space for the ⊕
operation, under the standard interpretation where αp ⊕ (1 − α)q is a lottery that delivers
p in [0, 1]2 with probability α in [0, 1] and q in [0, 1]2 with the complementary probability
1− α; see Herstein and Milnor (1953). Moreover, let p ∨ q = (max(p1, q1),max(p2, q2)) and
p ∧ q = (min(p1, q1),min(p2, q2)) denote the standard lattice-theoretical join and meet for
the usual component-wise monotonic partial ordering = in R2.
We make the following assumptions about the mediator’s preference % over [0, 1]2, where
 and ∼ have the usual meaning. For simplicity, we write “for sure” instead of the more
accurate “with probability 1”.
A.1 (Regularity) % is a complete preorder, continuous and mixture independent.
This implies that there exists a real-valued function V : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1], unique up to
positive affine transformations, that represents % and is linear with respect to ⊕; that is,
V (αp⊕ (1− α)q) = αV (p) + (1 − α)V (q), for any α in [0, 1] and any p,q in [0, 1]2. See
Theorem 8.4 in Fishburn (1970). Quite interestingly, Nash (1950, p. 157) explicitly points
out how an analog of A.1 is implied in his model by the assumption that both bargainers are
expected utility maximizers.
A.2 (Non-triviality) (1, 1)  (0, 0).
This rules out the trivial case where the mediator is indifferent between a proposal that
is accepted for sure by both bargainers and another proposal that is refused for sure by both
bargainers.
A.3 (Disagreement indifference) for any p, q in [0, 1], (p, 0) ∼ (0, q).
This is named after Assumption DI in Border and Segal (1997), who also study a pref-
erence relation over solutions. Their paper is discussed in Section 5.2. Framed within the
Nash model, Assumption DI states the following: a solution that assigns to either player the
same utility he gets at the disagreement point is as good as the disagreement point itself.
In simple words, a solution that gives one player the worst individually rational outcome is
equivalent to a solution that gives both bargainers the same utility as the disagreement point.
In our probability-based framework, it states that having one of the bargainers refusing for
sure is equivalent to having both refusing for sure. A proposal is accepted if and only if both
bargainers agree to it.
A.4 (Consistency over individual probabilities) for any p in [0, 1],
p(1, 1)⊕ (1− p)(0, 1) ∼ (p, 1) and p(1, 1)⊕ (1− p)(1, 0) ∼ (1, p).
This states the following. Assume that one bargainer is known to accept for sure. Then
the mediator is indifferent between a lottery that has the second bargainer accepting for
sure with probability p and refusing for sure with probability (1 − p), or a proposal where
the second bargainer accepts with probability p. Intuitively, the first lottery has an “objec-
tive” probability p of success, while the second proposal has a “subjective” probability with
the same value p. We assume that the mediator is indifferent between the two modalities.
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Technically speaking, the assumption aligns the marginal acceptance probabilities with the
corresponding joint acceptance probability if one of the two bargainers accepts for sure.
A.5 (Weak complementarity) for any p,q in [0, 1]2,
(1/2) (p ∨ q)⊕ (1/2) (p ∧ q) % (1/2)p⊕ (1/2)q
This is named after Axiom S in Francetich (2013). It states that a fifty-fifty lottery
between two pairs of acceptance probabilities p and q is weakly inferior to a fifty-fifty lottery
between their extremes (under the component–wise ordering). The interpretation is the
following. Suppose p1 ≥ q1 and q2 ≥ p2. When the individual acceptance probabilities
improve from (q1, p2) to (p1, p2), the increase in the probability of success for a proposal
cannot be greater than when they change from (q1, q2) to (p1, q2). Whatever advantage is
gained when the first bargainer’s acceptance probability increases by p1 − q1, it adds more
to the probability of success when the second bargainer is more likely to accept. In simple
words, the individual acceptance probabilities are (weakly) complementary towards getting
to an agreement. For a particularly sharp illustration, let p1 = q2 = 1 and p2 = q1 = 0:
clearly, joint acceptance occurs only at (1, 1), and a fifty-fifty lottery between (1, 1) and (0, 0)
is strictly better than a fifty-fifty lottery between (1, 0) and (0, 1).
We show by example in Section 3.6 that, under A.1, the four assumptions A.2–A.5 are
logically independent.
3.2 A general characterisation
Our first result gives a behavioural characterisation for the preferences of the mediator. Under
A1–A5, there exists a unique copula that represents %. Given the marginal distributions,
any copula identifies a joint probability distribution consistent with them; see Section 2 and
Nelsen (2006). For any possible dependence structure linking the marginals, there is a copula
that describes it.
Theorem 2. The preference relation % satisfies A.1–A.5 if and only if there exists a unique
copula C : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] that represents %, in the sense that
p % q if and only if C(p) ≥ C(q).
Proof. Necessity being obvious, we prove only sufficiency. By A.1, the Mixture Space The-
orem (Herstein and Milnor, 1953) implies that there exists a unique (up to positive affine
transformations) function V : [0, 1]2 → R that represents % and is linear with respect to
⊕. By A.2, V (1, 1)− V (0, 0) > 0. Apply the appropriate positive affine transformation and
consider the (unique) function C : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] defined by
C(p, q) =
V (p, q)− V (0, 0)
V (1, 1)− V (0, 0) .
We show that C satisfies the two defining properties C1–C2 of a copula given in Section 2.
By A.3, we have C(p, 0) = C(0, p) = C(0, 0) = 0, for any p in [0, 1]. Moreover, clearly
C(1, 1) = 1. By A.4 and linearity, for any p in [0, 1], we get C(p, 1) = C(p(1, 1) ⊕ (1 −
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p)(0, 1)) = pC(1, 1) + (1 − p)C(0, 1) = p; a similar argument shows that C(1, p) = p. This
proves C1.
By A.5 and the linearity of C, for all p,q in [0, 1]2, it follows that
1
2
C(p ∨ q) + 1
2
C(p ∧ q) = C
(
1
2
(p ∨ q)⊕ 1
2
(p ∧ q)
)
≥ C(1
2
p⊕ 1
2
q) =
1
2
C(p) +
1
2
C(q),
so that C is supermodular, and C2 holds. 
In our setup, this result has a straightforward interpretation. A pair (p, q) of acceptance
probabilities in B represents the individual probability that each bargainer accepts the un-
derlying proposal. When the mediator’s preferences satisfy axioms A.1–A.5, she behaves as
if she aggregates these individual probabilities by consistently using a (unique) copula C and
computes the joint probability C(p, q) that the bargainers strike an agreement. Since the
copula is arbitrary, the mediator may entertain any subjective opinion regarding the depen-
dence structure (as embedded in the copula) between the individual acceptance probabilities.
The proposals in B are ranked accordingly to the resulting joint acceptance probability.
A %-maximal element in B is a choice that maximises the probability that the bargainers
accept the underlying proposal and strike an agreement. Since any copula is necessarily
Lipschitz continuous and B is compact, the set of %-maximal elements in B is not empty
and a solution exists. On the other hand, our assumptions do not imply its uniqueness. In
general, the solution in B corresponds to an equivalence class of pairs of individual acceptance
probabilities (including lotteries over those) for which the mediator assesses the same joint
acceptance probability. It is worth noting that B is not required to be convex or even
connected.
The copula representing the preferences of the mediator in Theorem 2 is linear with
respect to ⊕, in the sense that C(αp⊕ (1−α)q) = αC(p)+(1−α)C(q). When the mediator
evaluates the probability of success for a lottery, she assesses first the probabilities of success
for p and q through C(p) and C(q), and then she mixes them with the same weights defining
the lottery. On the contrary, our assumptions do not imply linearity with respect to convex
combinations of points in [0, 1]2 based on the standard + operator.
Two simple variations on Theorem 2 are worth mentioning. Recall that a copula C(p, q)
is (weakly) increasing in each argument. Therefore, the preference relation % does not violate
the (weak) Pareto ordering: if p1 ≥ q1 and p2 ≥ q2, then (p1, p2) % (q1, q2). But it may not
satisfy the (strong) Pareto ordering, under which the condition (p1− q1)(p2− q2) > 0 implies
(p1, p2)  (q1, q2). Consider a mild strengthening of A.5, where we write p ./ q to indicate
that p 6= q and that p and q are not comparable with respect to the usual partial ordering
=.
A.5∗ (Complementarity) for any p,q in [0, 1]2,
(1/2) (p ∨ q)⊕ (1/2) (p ∧ q) % (1/2)p⊕ (1/2)q.
Moreover, if p ./ q,
(1/2) (p ∨ q)⊕ (1/2) (p ∧ q)  (1/2)p⊕ (1/2)q.
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In combination with the other assumptions, this rules out “thick” indifference curves
and makes % consistent with the (strong) Pareto ordering: if p1 ≥ q1 and p2 ≥ q2, then
(p1, p2) % (q1, q2) and, moreover, (p1, p2)  (q1, q2) if (p1 − q1)(p2 − q2) > 0. This follows
from the next result, because any strictly supermodular copula is strictly increasing in each
argument.
Theorem 3. The preference relation % satisfies A.1–A.5∗ if and only if there exists a unique
strictly supermodular copula C : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] that represents %.
A second variation embodies an elementary notion of fairness.
A.6 (Anonymity) for any p, q in [0, 1], (p, q) ∼ (q, p).
This states that the evaluation for any pair (p, q) of individual acceptance probabilities is
unaffected by permutations, and hence is anonymous with respect to the bargainers’ identity.
The following result is immediate.
Theorem 4. The preference relation % satisfies A.1–A.5 and A.6 if and only if there exists
a unique symmetric copula C : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] that represents %.
Symmetric copulas are the most frequently studied class, and Anonymity seems to be
a natural requirement. However, it remains a special case. The analog of some solutions
(including the Nash solution) require Complementarity and imply Anonymity, and hence are
associated with strictly supermodular and symmetric copulas.
Theorem 2 shows that we can characterise different solution concepts for cooperative
bargaining as the aggregation (via copula) of two individual acceptance probabilities into a
joint probability of success. As a special case, the following Theorem 5 proves that stochastic
independence is the key assumption for deriving the product operator underlying the Nash
solution.
Since each copula models a different dependence structure, other solutions for cooperative
bargaining may be recovered under alternative assumptions. In particular, the two extreme
assumptions of maximal positive dependence and maximal negative dependence between the
individual acceptance probabilities bring about the egalitarian solution and a variant of the
(truncated) utilitarian solution, discussed respectively in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
3.3 The Nash solution
The Nash solution is a special case of Theorem 2 when the copula chosen by the mediator
presumes stochastic independence among the individual acceptance probabilities. That is,
the Nash solution emerges whenever we assume that these individual probabilities are inde-
pendent. This seems by far a very natural requirement, and in our view it gives the Nash
solution a central position among the special cases.
Under A.5∗, we need only one additional assumption to characterise the Nash solution.
A.7 (Rescaling indifference) for any α, p, q in [0, 1], (αp, q) ∼ (p, αq).
This states that the mediator is indifferent whether the same proportional reduction in
the acceptance probability is applied to one bargainer or to the other one. The probability
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of joint acceptance is equally affected when downsizing (by the same factor) the individual
propensity to accept of either bargainer. Clearly, A.7 implies A.3 (Disagreement indifference)
and A.6 (Anonymity).
Theorem 5. The preference relation % satisfies A.1–A2, A4–A.5∗, and A.7 if and only if it
is represented by the copula Π(p, q) = p · q.
Proof. Necessity is obvious. Sufficiency follows if we show that all the indifference curves for
the representing copula are hyperbolas. First, suppose that p = (p1, p2) and q = (q1, q2)
satisfy p1p2 = q1q2; without loss of generality, assume p1 > q1 and p2 < q2. Consider
p ∨ q = (p1, q2) and let α = q1/p1 = q2/p2 < 1. By A.7, we obtain (αp1, q2) ∼ (p1, αq2) and,
substituting for α, we find q = (q1, q2) ∼ (p1, p2) = p. Therefore, two points on the same
hyperbola are indifferent.
Conversely, suppose without loss of generality that p1p2 > q1q2. We show that (p1, p2) 
(q1, q2). Let α = (q1q2)/(p1p2) < 1. By strong Pareto dominance, (p1, p2)  (αp1, p2).
Since the point (αp1, p2) lies on the same hyperbola as (q1, q2), by the first part of this proof
(αp1, p2) ∼ (q1, q2). Hence, (p1, p2)  (αp1, p2) ∼ (q1, q2). 
This result uncovers an appealing interpretation for the product operator underlying the
Nash solution for cooperative bargaining. When the bargaining problem is framed with
respect to pairs of acceptance probabilities (instead of utilities), the product operator is the
natural consequence of the assumption that the contribution of these individual probabilities
to the joint acceptance probability satisfies stochastic independence.
The key behavioural implication of Theorem 5 is the following. Suppose that the mediator
evaluates that the probability of joint acceptance for a proposal (p, q) is pi. For any α in
[0, 1], by the linearity of C, the mediator attributes a probability of success αpi to the lottery
α(p, q)⊕(1−α)0. Intuitively, the introduction of the α-randomisation reduces the probability
pi of success by a factor α. The reduction is multiplicative because the randomising device
is (tacitly assumed as) stochastically independent. Under the Nash copula, any α-reduction
to either of the individual acceptance probabilities has the same effect on the mediator’s
evaluation as an α-randomisation: α(p, q) ⊕ (1 − α)0 ∼ (αp, q) ∼ (p, αq). It is immaterial
whether the reduction comes from an (objective) lottery or from a (subjective) assessment.
3.4 The egalitarian solution
In the utility–based Nash model, the egalitarian solution (Kalai, 1977) recommends the max-
imal point at which utility gains from the disagreement point d are equal. More simply,
for a Nash problem (S, d), the egalitarian solution selects the maximiser of the function
min {(u1 − d1), (u2 − d2)} for (u1, u2) in S and ui ≥ di for i = 1, 2.
In our probability-based formulation, this translates to the requirement that the solution
for a bargaining problem B is the (set of) maximiser(s) of the function min (p1, p2) for p in
B. Consider the following assumption.
A.8 (Meet indifference) for any p, q in [0, 1], (p, p ∧ q) ∼ (p ∧ q, q).
This states that the mediator is indifferent between two pairs of acceptance probabilities
as far as they have the same meet. Intuitively, preferences over (p, q) depend only on the
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smallest value between p and q. Clearly, A.8 implies A.3 (Disagreement indifference) and A.6
(Anonymity). The manifest analogies between A.7 and A.8 reappear in the formulation of
the following result, whose proof is similar and thus can be omitted.
Theorem 6. The preference relation % satisfies A.1–A2, A4–A.5∗, and A.8 if and only if it
is represented by the copula M(p, q) = min(p, q).
This characterises the representing copula under Meet indifference as the Fre´chet upper
bound M(p, q) = min(p, q), that provides the strongest possibile positive dependence be-
tween two marginal distributions. Therefore, we can reinterpret the egalitarian solution as
the recommendation that maximises the probability of joint acceptance when the mediator
assumes that the individual acceptance probabilities are maximally positively dependent.
3.5 The utilitarian solution
There exist alternative formulations for the utilitarian solutions in the Nash model. They
share the general principle that the solution should recommend an alternative that maximises
the sum of utilities, or of utility increments over the disagreement point. The main obstacle
impeding a unified definition is that utilities are defined only up to positive affine transfor-
mations. We consider relative utilitarianism, that normalises the individual utilities to have
infimum zero and supremum one before considering their sum. This reasonable normalisation
choice was first considered in Arrow (1963); see Dhillon and Mertens (1999).
In our probability-based framework, the normalisation issue is immaterial and we can
simply map the utilitarian precept into the (still) generic recommendation of maximising
the sum of individual acceptance probabilities. Clearly, if we are to reinterpret this sum as
a probability of joint success, this generic recommendation needs to be suitably qualified.
Consider the following assumption.
A.9 (Average indifference) for any p, q in [0, 1], (p, q) ∼ (p+q2 , p+q2 ).
Consider all pairs of acceptance probabilities on the segment between (p, q) and (p+q2 ,
p+q
2 ).
As we move inward towards the bisector, the components are “less spread out” and one indi-
vidual acceptance probability decreases at the expense of the other. Assumption A.9 states
that the mediator is indifferent among all these pairs of acceptance probabilities, because
the increase of one exactly compensates the diminution of the other. Intuitively, the two
individual probabilities behave as substitutes towards the joint probability of acceptance.
Clearly, this is at odds with A.5∗, but it is compatible with A.5. Moreover, A.9 implies A.6
(Anonymity) but not A.3 (Disagreement indifference).
Theorem 7. The preference relation % satisfies A.1–A.5 and A.9 if and only if it is repre-
sented by the copula W (p, q) = max(p+ q − 1, 0).
Proof. Necessity is obvious. As for sufficiency, by Theorem 2 there exists a copula C rep-
resenting %. It is known that W is the only quasi-convex copula; see Example 3.27 in
Nelsen (2006). Hence, it suffices to show that A.9 implies that C is quasi-convex; that is, for
any α in (0, 1) and p,q in [0, 1]2, we have C(αp + (1− α)q) ≤ max {C(p), C(q)}.
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For ease of notation, given p = (p1, p2), let p =
(p1+p2
2 ,
p1+p2
2
)
denote its symmetrised
counterpart lying on the main diagonal. Then A.9 states that p ∼ p and thus C(p) = C(p).
Assume without loss of generality that q1 + q2 ≤ p1 + p2. Since C is increasing over the main
diagonal, we obtain
C (αp + (1− α)q) = C
(
αp + (1− α)q
)
≤ C (p) = C(p),
and thus C is quasi-convex. 
This characterises the representing copula under Average indifference as the Fre´chet lower
bound W (p, q) = max(p+q−1, 0), that provides the strongest possibile negative dependence
between two marginal distributions. Therefore, we can reinterpret this form of (truncated)
utilitarian solution as the recommendation that maximises the probability of joint accep-
tance when the mediator assumes that the individual acceptance probabilities are maximally
negatively correlated.
This interpretation requires a comment. The copula W (p, q) is strongly Pareto increasing
on the triangle above the diagonal from (0, 1) to (1, 0), and is zero on the rest of its domain.
If the mediator’s preferences are represented by this copula, she behaves as an utilitarian for
all pairs above the diagonal, and is indifferent for the pairs below the diagonal, suggesting
that she may violate (strong) Pareto dominance. The reason for the mediator’s indifference is
that, under the assumptions of Theorem 7, she opinates that any feasible proposal mapping
to a pair (p, q) below the diagonal will be refused for sure. Hence, from her viewpoint, it is
neither better nor worse than 0.
3.6 Logical independence of the assumptions
This section provides simple examples to show that, under A.1, the four assumptions A.2–
A.5 used in Theorem 2 are logically independent. Recall that A.1 implies the existence of
a real-valued function V : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1], unique up to positive affine transformations, that
represents % and is linear with respect to ⊕. We recall each assumption and list the associated
counterexample immediately after. We omit quantifiers when they are obvious.
A.2 (Non-triviality) (1, 1)  (0, 0).
Consider V (p, q) = k, for some constant k in [0, 1]. Then A.3 holds because V (p, 0) = k =
V (0, q). A.4 holds because pV (1, 1)+(1−p)V (0, 1) = k = V (p, 1), and similarly for the second
relation. And A.5 holds because (1/2)V (p∨q)+(1/2)V (p∧q) = k = (1/2)V (p)+(1/2)V (q).
However, A.2 does not hold because V (1, 1) = k = V (0, 0).
A.3 (Disagreement indifference) for any p, q in [0, 1], (p, 0) ∼ (0, q).
Consider V (p, q) = p. Then A.2 holds because V (1, 1) = 1 > 0 = V (0, 0). A.4 holds
because pV (1, 1) + (1− p)V (0, 1) = p = V (p, 1), and pV (1, 1) + (1− p)V (1, 0) = 1 = V (1, p).
And A.5 holds because
1
2
V (p ∨ q) + 1
2
V (p ∧ q) = 1
2
(p1 ∨ q1) + 1
2
(p1 ∧ q1) = 1
2
p1 +
1
2
q1 =
1
2
V (p) +
1
2
V (q)
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However, A.3 does not hold: for p > 0 and any q, we have V (p, 0) = p > 0 = V (0, q).
A.4 (Consistency over individual probabilities] for any p in [0, 1],
p(1, 1)⊕ (1− p)(0, 1) ∼ (p, 1) and p(1, 1)⊕ (1− p)(1, 0) ∼ (1, p).
Consider V (p, q) = p2q. Then A.2 holds because V (1, 1) = 1 > 0 = V (0, 0). A.3 holds
because V (p, 0) = 0 = V (0, q). A.5 holds because the first mixed derivative of V is positive,
and hence V is supermodular. However, A.4 does not hold because pV (1, 1)+(1−p)V (0, 1) =
p > p2 = V (p, 1).
A.5 (Weak complementarity) for any p,q in [0, 1]2,
(1/2) (p ∨ q)⊕ (1/2) (p ∧ q) % (1/2)p⊕ (1/2)q
Consider the function
V (p, q) =
{
min
(
p, q, 13 , p+ q − 23
)
if 23 ≤ p+ q ≤ 43
max(p+ q − 1, 0) otherwise,
borrowed from Exercise 2.11 in Nelsen (2006). Then A.2 holds because V (1, 1) = 1 >
0 = V (0, 0). A.3 holds because V (p, 0) = 0 = V (0, q). A.4 holds because pV (1, 1) + (1 −
p)V (0, 1) = p = V (p, 1), and similarly for the second relation. But A.5 does not hold: let
p = (1/3, 2/3) and q = (2/3, 1/3), so that p ∨ q = (2/3, 2/3) and p ∧ q = (1/3, 1/3). Then
V (p ∨ q) + V (p ∧ q)− V (p)− V (q) = −1/3 < 0, contradicting supermodularity.
4 Commentary
This section discusses the model and two interpretations of the results presented in Section 3,
contrasting them with the related literature.
4.1 Fundamentals
The Nash model is an abstraction of real bargaining situations. As mentioned, Rubinstein,
Safra, and Thomson (1992) — from now on, RST — have re-examined the Nash model,
moving away from the utility-based language of the Nash model towards the fundamentals
of a two-person bargaining problem. This work indirectly provides a foundation for the Nash
model that is independent of the assumption that bargainers maximise expected utility. We
provide a similar description of the fundamentals for our model, and argue that they nest
RST’s formulation.
There are two agents and a set A of feasible alternatives, described in physical terms and
viewed as deterministic outcomes. The set A is a nonempty compact subset of a connected
topological space X. Each agent i = 1, 2 has an ordinal preference order %i over X, and
hence over A. Preferences are continuous: therefore, there exist ordinal (i.e., unique up to
increasing transformations) and continuous value functions vi(x) such that x %i y if and only
if vi(x) ≥ vi(y). Moreover, agents’ preferences are (jointly) non-trivial: there are alternatives
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x, y in A such that x i y for both i. We add a final simplifying assumption: there are no
alternatives x, y in A such that x ∼i y for both i. This avoids the need to rephrase definitions
and results in terms of equivalence classes.
A native bargaining problem is a triple (A,%1,%2) that satisfies the assumptions above.
Compared to RST, we assume neither a commonly known disagreement point δ (in physical
terms) nor that agents’ preferences are defined over lotteries where the prizes are elements
of X. In particular, we do not require that agents are expected utility maximisers or, more
generally, that their preferences over A are representable by (cardinal) utility functions that
are invariant only to positive affine transformation. Compared to the six restrictions made
in RST (Section 2), we maintain (i)-(ii)-(v), weaken (iii) to non-triviality, and drop (iv)-(vi).
4.2 Interpretations
We provide two compatible interpretations for the bare-bones model of Section 3. The first
one is behavioural and casts the mediator’s problem as a decision problem with incomplete
information. The second interpretation hijacks this setup, and shows that the classical Nash
model (based on utilities) is mathematically equivalent to our probability-based formulation.
4.2.1 The target-based interpretation
The first interpretation takes the viewpoint of a mediator, hired by two bargainers to recom-
mend them a feasible proposal over which they could strike an agreement. Given a native
bargaining problem (A,%1,%2), the mediator may suggest any feasible alternative in A, but
cannot impose it. Her goal is to put on the table a proposal that each bargainer will individ-
ually evaluate and decide whether to accept. She may take into account issues of fairness or
other considerations, but eventually her task is to select a proposal from A and her success is
defined by its joint acceptance on the part of the bargainers. The mediator wants to maximise
her probability of success.
We cast this situation as a decision problem under incomplete information. A bargainer
i = 1, 2 accepts a proposal x when x %i ti. We say that ti is the minimum acceptance target
for i. We may think of ti as the minimal “fair” outcome that the bargainer has in mind, or
as a proxy for his toughness (akin to his type), or as the outcome of a deliberative process
over the risk of disagreement. The crucial assumption is that the mediator has incomplete
information about ti. She knows that %i is continuous, and she believes that the type Ti of
i has a random distribution with an (order-)convex support on (X,%i).
Given that %i is continuous on X, it admits a real-valued representation by a continuous
function vi : X → R. Therefore, x %i ti if and only if vi(x) ≥ vi(ti) and we can equivalently
reformulate the incomplete information about Ti as a random variable v(Ti) on (R,≥) with
c.d.f. Fi and convex support. Consequently, P (x %i Ti) = Fi ◦ vi(x), where Fi is a strictly
increasing and continuous c.d.f. on R. Note that vi is unique only up to increasing transfor-
mations, so Fi is not uniquely defined; however, the function Fi ◦ vi is unique. Therefore,
we assume that the incomplete information of the mediator about each bargainer’s type is
summarised by Fi ◦ vi; in particular, given a proposal x, this is mapped into an individual
acceptance probability pi = Fi ◦ vi(x).
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The model in Section 3 takes this as its point of departure and provides a behavioural
characterisation for the mediator’s preferences over proposals in A. She ranks the feasible
alternatives by their probability of being accepted by both bargainers, after combining their
individual acceptance probabilities into a joint probability of success based on their depen-
dence structure. For any native bargaining problem on A, the solution proposed by the
mediator is a feasible alternative that maximises her induced preference order % over A.
We note two advantages for this behavioural interpretation. It is compatible with (but
does not require) the assumption that agents are expected utility maximisers. In fact, it is
not even necessary to include lotteries over feasible alternatives among the objects of choice
for the bargainers. A similar comment applies for the disagreement point: in the literature, it
is customary to mention it and immediately dispatch it by normalising its value to zero. Our
model does not presume that a disagreement point δ (in physical terms) is known; however, if
one is given, then the agent’s individual rationality implies that his target has zero probability
to lie below δ, and thus P (δ i Ti) = 0.
4.2.2 Nash bargaining redux
The original Nash model selects a solution by maximising the product of two von Neumann–
Morgenstern utilities (from now on, NM). Our approach picks a solution by maximising a
copula that aggregates two individual probabilities. The goal of this section is to show that
these two approaches are consistent and strictly linked.
The key decision-theoretic observation is that the utility-based NM model may be recast
in an exclusively probability-based language; see Castagnoli and LiCalzi (1996) and Bordley
and LiCalzi (2000). For simplicity, consider preferences over a compact nonempty interval
B = [x∗, x∗] in R. Suppose that the Bernoulli index U is strictly increasing, bounded, and
continuous; see Grandmont (1972) for an axiomatization. Applying if necessary a positive
affine transformation, let U(x∗) = 0 and U(x∗) = 1. Then U(x) has the formal properties of
a cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.), and on some appropriate probability space there
exists a random variable T with c.d.f. U(x) = P (T ≤ x). We call T a (random) target.
Let L the space of lotteries over B. If a lottery X in L has c.d.f. F and is stochastically
independent of T , the chain of equalities
EU(X) =
∫
U(x) dF (x) =
∫
P (T ≤ x) dF (x) = P (X ≥ T ) (1)
shows that the expected utility EU(X) is formally equivalent to the probability that the
lottery X scores better than the target T . Hence, a claim made in a utility-based language
for EU(X) maps to an equally valid statement in a target-based language for P (X ≥ T ).
In particular, we can replace the notion of a cardinal Bernoulli index U(x) that is unique
only up to positive affine transformations by the simpler concept of a c.d.f P (T ≤ x) for the
target T . The NM model for preferences under risk postulates that preferences are linear in
probabilities. It can be equivalently interpreted as a procedure that ranks lotteries by the
expected value of their Bernoulli index or by the probability that they score better than a
target T ; see LiCalzi (1999).
We are ready to consider the Nash bargaining problem (S, d). Recall that S is a compact
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and convex subset of feasible NM utility pairs, while d represents bargainers’ utilities in case
of breakdown. The crucial, but often implicit, assumption of the Nash model is that the NM-
utility functions U1 and U2 are commonly known. Using (1), this reads as the assumption
that the distributions of the bargainers’ targets T1 and T2 are ex ante commonly known,
whereas the targets are private information.
In our former interpretation, given a proposal x, the mapping pi = Fi ◦ vi(x) is based
on the mediator’s beliefs. Under common knowledge, the alternative interpretation is that
the bargainers themselves agree on their own individual acceptance probabilities and may
directly use these as input in constructing a bargaining solution. The missing step for the
two bargainers is how to aggregate the commonly known individual probabilities and evaluate
the proposals. This aggregation problem may be attacked in different ways. Ours is a
behavioural characterisation: if the agents have common knowledge of the joint distribution
of their targets ex ante, they maximise the probability of success by settling on the commonly
known copula. In particular, if it is common knowledge that their two targets are ex ante
stochastically independent, they should settle for the Nash solution. A related normative
approach is pursued by Border and Segal (1997), discussed in Section 5.2.
4.2.3 Related literature
A relevant byproduct of our approach is the interpretation of the product operator in the Nash
solution as the consequence of an assumption of stochastic independence between individual
acceptance probabilities. To the best of our knowledge, the utility-based literature offers two
competing interpretations for the product operator. We recall them briefly, for comparison.
Roth (1979, Section I.C) shows that we can frame the bargaining model as a single-person
decision problem, where each agent chooses how much to claim by maximising his expected
utility under the assumption that the claim of the other bargainer i is uniformly distributed
between his disagreement point di and his ideal point mi (defined as i’s highest feasible
utility). The Nash solution emerges from the independent choices of the two bargainers. A
very similar interpretation is also in Glycopantis and Miur (1994), who make no reference
to Roth (1979). As Roth himself acknowledges, this approach is outside the game-theoretic
tradition, because the processes by which the two agents form their expectations are not
mutually consistent. On the other hand, similarly to ours, this interpretation is grounded on
an assumption of independence between the evaluations made by the two agents.
A second interpretation for the Nash product is proposed in Trockel (2008). He views
the Nash product as a special case of a social welfare function that aggregates the admissible
payoff pairs into a social ranking. It evaluates a recommendation u by the Lebesgue measure
of the set of utility pairs that are Pareto-dominated by u. Without advocating more than a
formal analogy, we note that any copula in Theorem 2 may be interpreted as a social welfare
function adopted by the mediator to select her recommendation.
4.3 Domain
The Nash model is framed in the space of utilities: it implicitly assumes that all native
bargaining problems with the same utility representation are indistinguishable, and thus
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must have the same solution. This hidden assumption is probably extreme. RST discuss at
length its implications, and lay bare the tradeoff between the power of Nash’s axioms and
the granularity of the domain. Switching to a preference-based language, they remould the
assumption by keeping fixed the set A of alternatives and varying the bargainers’ preferences.
In their approach, a bargaining solution is a function that assigns a unique element of a given
set A to every pair of bargainers’ preferences over lotteries on A ∪ {d}.
Consistent with Nash (1950), however, the standard way to specify the domain of the
solution is to hold bargainers’ preferences fixed and let the set A of alternatives vary. The
typical formulation considers all the Nash problems based on the same disagreement point
(in utilities). For generality, we cast our presentation assuming that the domain of our model
contains all compact (but not necessarily convex) subsets of [0, 1]2. However, this domain
may be considerably shrunk and, in practical applications, it is reasonable to do so. The
domain must be rich enough to include enough problems and elicit preferences over [0, 1]2.
A smaller domain may be more appropriate to ensure that the dependence embedded in the
copula refers to comparable situations: for instance, the two bargainers should be the same,
and the problems submitted to the mediator should justify similar answers.
Here is an exemplification. Fix two bargainers and their preferences on X. For any
feasible (compact) set A, let di be the acceptance probability for a %i-minimal proposal
in A; similarly, let mi be the acceptance probability for a %i-maximal proposal. Borrowing
language from the Nash model, let d and m be called the disagreement point and the ideal
point (in probabilities). A rich domain for our model may consider only the compact subsets
in [0, 1]2 associated with the same d, and for those we may characterise a preference relation
%d represented by a copula C such that C(d) = 0. (We assume that an agent rejects a
minimal proposal for sure.) A smaller but still rich domain is formed by the bargaining
problems with the same d and m: if we assume that an agent accepts his ideal point for
sure, the representing copula would have both C(d) = 0 and C(m) = 1; see Cao (1982) for
a similar normalisation over utility functions in the Nash model.
5 Applications and extensions
This section illustrates the richness and robustness of the target-based approach. We present
a few applications and extensions, including comparative statics, testable restrictions, and
prescriptive advice.
5.1 Comparative statics
A small but elegant literature deals with the comparative statics of the Nash solution. For
a typical result, consider Theorem 1 in Kihlstrom et al. (1981): “The utility which Nash’s
solution assigns to a player increases as his opponent becomes more risk averse.” Let us
consider the implications of this result for the target-based approach, when the Bernoulli
index function Ui(x) = Fi◦vi(x) is interpreted as the cumulative distribution function P (x %i
Ti).
An agent with a Bernoulli index function V1(x) is more risk averse than an agent charac-
terised by U1(x) if and only if there exists an increasing concave transformation K such that
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V1(x) = K ◦ U1(x). Under the target-based interpretation, both V1 and U1 are distribution
functions over the same domain and with the same range in [0, 1]. Therefore, the function K
is bounded in [0, 1] with limx↓0K(x) ≥ 0 and limx↑1K(x) = 1; by concavity, it follows that
K(x) ≥ x for all x. Hence, V1(x) ≥ U1(x) for all x; that is, viewed as c.d.f.’s, V1 is stochas-
tically dominated by U1. In simple words, the target associated with V1 can be regarded
as “less demanding” than the target associated with U1. Theorem 1 may be reformulated
as follows. At the Nash solution, i = 1, 2 is offered a better proposal and his individual
acceptance probability increases when the target of the other agent j = 3 − i becomes less
demanding. If an agent becomes more accommodating, the Nash solution ends up rewarding
the other one.
A related comment concerns the observation recently made in Alon and Lehrer (2014)
that the Nash solution is not ordinally equivalent. Suppose that two agents are to divide a
unit amount of money. Let xi in [0, 1] be the quantity attributed to Agent i, with x1 + x2 =
1. From an ordinal viewpoint, assume that each agent has increasing (and continuous)
preferences in the amount xi he secures. A model with ordinal preferences U1(x) = U2(x) = x
is equivalent to a model with ordinal preferences U1(x) =
√
x and U2(x) = 1 −
√
1− x.
However, when applied literally, the Nash solution predicts x1 = x2 = 1/2 for the first
model, and x1 = 1/4 and x2 = 3/4 for the second one. In our approach, the function
Ui(x) = Fi ◦ vi(x) embodies both the ordinal preference expressed by vi and the individual
acceptance probability represented by Fi. The two models are ordinally equivalent, but in
the second model Agent 1 has a less demanding target while Agent 2 has a more demanding
target. (In a utility-based language, what drives the difference is that in the second model
Agent 1 is more risk averse while Agent 2 is less risk averse.)
These examples deal with comparative statics over the distribution of individual accep-
tance probabilities. The target-based approach, however, allows to study analogous results
based on (partial) orderings for the copulas underlying the dependence that links individual
probabilities to the joint probability of success. We consider only a simple example. Given
two copulas C1 and C2, the concordance ordering states that C1 is more concordant than C2
if C1(p) ≥ C2(p) for all p in [0, 1]2. Suppose this is the case for C1 and C2, and let p∗i be a
solution under the copula Ci, for i = 1, 2 and the same bargaining problem B. Clearly,
C1(p
∗
1) ≥ C1(p∗2) ≥ C2(p∗2)
so that the joint probability of success at the solution is increasing in the concordance order-
ing. Agents with concordant targets are more likely to strike a deal.
5.2 Social preferences and implementation
The model in Section 3 characterises a preference relation % and derives the bargaining
solution through the maximisation of a copula. A similar approach is followed by Blackorby
et al. (1994), who define a bargaining solution as the (set of) maximisers for a generalised
Gini ordering, represented by a quasi-concave, increasing function that is linear on the rank-
ordered subsets of [0, 1]2. The class of generalised Gini orderings spans a continuum of
solutions, exhibiting different levels of inequality aversion and including the egalitarian and
16
the utilitarian solutions as extreme cases.
We use their model as an example to illustrate the flexibility and limitations of our
copula-based approach. For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2, the family of symmetric copulas
Cα,α(u, v) =

u+ α1−αv − α1−α if α ≤ u ≤ v ≤ 1
v + α1−αu− α1−α if α ≤ v ≤ u ≤ 1
0 otherwise
represents a continuum of affine (truncated) generalised Gini orderings. This family includes
the egalitarian solution for α = 0 and the utilitarian solution for α = 1/2. Accordingly, the
parameter α may be interpreted as an index of (increasing) inequality aversion. (This family
is nested in a larger class of asymmetric copulas Cα,β with α, β > 0 and α + β < 1; see
Exercise 3.8 in Nelsen, 2006.) We say that this family is truncated because C(u, v) = 0 if
min{u, v} < α. The same comment made for the utilitarian solution in Section 3.5 applies
here, and clearly these copulas do not satisfy A5∗ when α > 0.
In our model, the copulas aggregate individual acceptance probabilities. One should be
careful not to carry formal analogies too far, but the copulas Cα,α may be used to model the
mediator’s aversion to inequalities among the individual acceptance probabilities. The alter-
native interpretation is that the copulas represent the stochastic dependence between agents’
targets and that this dependence drives the choices. If the mediator’s opinion is captured by
Cα,α, then her recommended solution exhibits (some degree of) inequality aversion between
the individual acceptance probabilities. If Cα,α rationalises the mediator’s recommendations,
these two interpretations are behaviourally indistinguishable.
More generally, when % is viewed as a social preference relation, one may recast the
representing copula as a social welfare function. This approach was pioneered by Kaneko and
Nakamura (1979), who define and characterise a Nash social welfare function that evaluates
the relative increases in individuals’ welfare from a state δ (in physical terms) unanimously
considered as the worst possible. In a subsequent paper, Kaneko (1980) takes care to point
out the conceptual differences between a social welfare function and a bargaining solution.
Put simply, however, the underlying idea is to pick a solution by maximising a function: this
works also over non-convex (compact) sets, but it may generate set-valued solutions. The
applicability of the Nash model is extended at the cost of forfeiting uniqueness.
Border and Segal (1997) provide an axiomatisation of the Nash (bargaining) solution that
is very close in spirit both to Kaneko’s insight and to our model. The natural interpretation
for their setup is that “the two bargainers hire an arbitrator to make choices for them” (p. 1)
and that the arbitrator has a preference order % over solutions. Border and Segal (1997)
motivate these preferences by analogy to social choice, suggesting that the arbitrator relies
on her notions of fairness to come up with a decision rule for all the bargaining problems.
An ancillary interpretation views the axioms as guidelines that both bargainers should find
acceptable before they agree to hire her. In their approach, the arbitrator’s selection is
justified by (normatively) binding axioms. Instead, we share with RST the search for a
behavioural characterisation that downplays the normative undertones: the mediator in our
model issues recommendations but cannot impose a solution.
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A related but independent issue concerns the implementation problem. Our model as-
sumes that the mediator knows the individual acceptance probabilities or, more precisely,
that she holds subjective beliefs about the agents’ targets. However, it may be in the agents’
interest to misrepresent their objectives and manipulate the mediator’s beliefs. Therefore,
one should worry about devising mechanisms that help elicit correct information from the
agents. An important step forward in this direction is made by Miyagawa (2002), who studies
this problem in the context of two-person bargaining. He provides a simple four-stage sequen-
tial game that fully implements a reasonably large class of two-person bargaining solutions
in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Miyagawa (2002) relies on four restrictive assumptions to derive his results. First, the
bargaining problem B must contain an alternative d that both agents consider least preferred.
Second, any most preferred alternative for i is judged by j = 3− i as indifferent to d. Third,
the Pareto frontier of B is strictly convex. Finally, the bargaining solution must be generated
by the maximisation of a (component-wise) increasing and quasi-concave function. This
generating function is an analog of the social welfare function just discussed. Coincidentally,
Miyagawa (2002) also assumes that this function is normalized to [0, 1] as in the copula-based
model. Each assumption has technical implications; for instance, the combination of strict
convexity for the Pareto frontier and quasi-concavity for the generating function entails the
uniqueness of the solution.
Compared to our setup, the crucial restriction is that the generating function must be
quasi-concave. A copula need not be quasi-concave; for instance, the function C(u, v) =
[M(u, v) + W (u, v)]/2 is a copula, but it is not quasi-concave. Hence, the applicability of
Miyagawa (2002) cannot generally be taken for granted. However, many common examples,
and all the functional forms presented so far, are quasi-concave. Therefore, the class of
solutions that are implementable includes the Nash, the egalitarian, and the (truncated)
utilitarian solutions. This is duly noted in Miyagawa (2002, p. 293), although an unfortunate
typo incorrectly mentions Kalai and Smorodinski (1975) instead of Kalai (1977).
5.3 Testable restrictions
An important requirement for a theory is the ability to generate falsifiable predictions. A
direct test exists for the target-based approach. We first illustrate the idea, and then formalise
it. As introduced in Section 3, a bargaining problem is represented by a compact set B in
[0, 1]2 where each point p in B corresponds to a pair of (acceptance) probabilities. A solution
is a map that for any problem B selects (at least) one point in B. The target-based approach
recommends a solution by maximising a suitable copula C over B.
Suppose that B contains a point p = (p1, p2) with p1 + p2 > 1. The Fre´chet lower bound
implies C(p) ≥ p1 + p2 − 1 > 0 for any C. Consider another feasible point q = (q1, q2) in B.
The Fre´chet upper bound implies C(q) ≤ min(q1, q2). Therefore, if min(q1, q2) < p1 + p2− 1,
the point p must be strictly preferred to q, and q cannot be a solution for any copula C.
More generally, by picking a point p∗ that maximises p1 + p2 − 1 in B, we can formulate the
following more stringent test.
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Proposition 8. Let p∗∈arg maxB (p1 + p2 − 1). Define the quadrant
Q :=
{
q∈ [0, 1]2 : min(q1, q2) ≥ p∗1 + p∗2 − 1
}
.
Then the solution must belong to B ∩Q.
Clearly, under A.5∗, a second immediate test is that a solution for B cannot be dominated
(in the strong Pareto ordering) by another point available in B.
A different class of restrictions is the following. As discussed in Section 5.2, our model
characterises bargaining solutions that can be rationalised by a copula. Roughly speaking,
this implies that we can generate only solutions that satisfy independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives. For instance, the well-known Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) solution (for short, KS
solution) cannot be derived in our model. Formally speaking, this solution violates A1 as can
be shown by a simple example. For the bargaining problem B1 represented by the convex
hull of the three points (0, 0), (0, 1), and (1, 0), the KS solution uniquely prescribes the point
p = (1/2, 1/2). On the other hand, for the bargaining problem B2 represented by the convex
hull of the four points (0, 0), (0, 1), (1/2, 1/2), and (1/2, 0), the KS solution uniquely pre-
scribes the point q = (1/3, 2/3). Since both p and q belong to B2 ⊂ B1, the first KS solution
reveals p  q while the second one reveals q  p, in violation of A1. Although it is formally
possible to rationalise the KS solution as the outcome of a lexicographic maximisation, we
find this approach interpretively unsatisfactory and thus we do not pursue it here.
5.4 Bargaining power
Since Binmore et al. (1986), the economic literature has made extensive use of an asymmetric
version of the Nash Solution as a reduced form for the differences in the bargaining power of
the agents. Formally, given a Nash bargaining problem (S, d), the asymmetric Nash solution is
defined as the maximiser of the product (u1− d1)a(u2− d2)1−a, for a in [0, 1]. As a increases
from 0 to 1, the asymmetric solution increasingly favours the first agent, with symmetry
holding at a = 1/2. For instance, consider the illustrative example from Section 5.1 where
two agents are to divide a unit amount of money, and U1(x) = U2(x) = x. The asymmetric
Nash solution gives x1 = a and x2 = 1− a.
It is natural to suggest using the function Na(p, q) = p
aq1−a but this is not a copula,
because it fails the second half of C1 in Section 2. Therefore, one cannot import the asym-
metric Nash solution under the copula-based approach. On the other hand, since asymmetric
copulas exist, we might search for some suitable (possibly parametric) substitute copula with
similar properties. For instance, by Theorem 2.1 in Liebscher (2008), for any copula C the
expression
Ca(p, q) = paq1−aC(p1−a, qa) = Na(p, q) · C(p1−a, qa)
defines an asymmetric copula, bearing an obvious relationship with Na. We argue that this
approach cannot work either.
Given a bargaining problem B, let ∆B(C) = sup(p,q)∈B |C(p, q)− C(q, p)| be the degree
of asymmetry for a function C over B. In our illustrative example, we obtain ∆B(Na) = 1 at
a = 0 and a = 1; that is, the family of asymmetric Nash solutions includes the case of maximal
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asymmetry. On the other hand, it is known that over B = [0, 1]2 we have ∆B(C) ≤ 1/3 for
any copula C (Nelsen, 2007); moreover, ∆B(C) ≤ 1/5 if C is also quasi-concave (Alvoni
and Papini, 2007). Therefore, there exist no copula that can mimic the extreme asymmetry
allowed by Na. In our illustrative example, for instance, ∆B(Na) is symmetric around a = 1/2
and increasing in |a − 1/2|, with ∆B(Na) = 1/3 at |a − 1/2| ≈ 0.219; therefore, the copula-
based approach cannot replicate Na for a outside of the interval [.281, .719].
In fact, a sound interpretation for modelling bargaining power requires more care. Con-
sider again the standard utility-based approach. The widespread use of the asymmetric Nash
solution is most likely due to its technical convenience, without much concern about the
lack of any intuitive meaning for the weighted geometric mean of utilities represented by Na.
However, utility-based axiomatic foundations exist in the literature. Kalai (1977a) provides a
characterisation for the asymmetric solution based on a replication argument for symmetric
solutions. His approach is technically clean and simple, but provides little intuition.
A richer and more convincing approach is Harsanyi and Selten (1972), who study the
case of fixed threats under incomplete information. This latter assumption, absent in the
Nash model, explicitly recognises that each player has private information about some of his
characteristics that are relevant for the bargaining process. Harsanyi and Selten (1972) show
that differential information provides a foundation for asymmetric solutions. We follow in
their footsteps and discuss a reduced form for modelling bargaining power in our illustrative
example, based on the copula-based approach.
Recall the distinction between the native bargaining problem (A,%1,%2) and the derived
bargaining problem B; see Section 4.1. Bargaining power must be traced back to the native
problem. The individual acceptance probabilities provide the link between this and the
derived problem, while the choice of a copula applies only to B as a tool to reconcile the
individual acceptance probabilities into a joint probability of success. Therefore, bargaining
power should affect the shape of the derived problem B rather than the functional form C.
In the illustrative example, the feasible set A =
{
(x1, x2)∈ [0, 1]2 : x1 + x2 ≤ 1
}
for the
native problem is especially simple to describe. In particular, it can be reduced to a uni-
dimensional problem
{
(x1, 1− x1)∈ [0, 1]2 : 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1
}
, where each agent only cares about
the money he receives. Assume Theorem 5; that is, the mediator aggregates agents’ accep-
tance probabilities assuming stochastic independence and C(p, q) = p · q. When Agent 1
has more bargaining power than Agent 2, he can aspire to higher targets. (As in Harsanyi
and Selten (1972), bargaining power is only one among several issues that may cause this
relationship to hold.) Everything else being equal, this us captured by the assumption that
T1 stochastically dominates T2.
For practical purposes, it is convenient to adopt a parametric formulation. For instance,
let P (x %i Ti) = xai where ai ≥ 0 can be interpreted as the bargaining strength of Agent i,
and assume a1 + a2 > 0. Clearly, T1 stochastically dominates T2 if and only if a1 ≥ a2. The
shape of the derived bargaining problem
B(a1, a2) =
{
(p1, p2)∈ [0, 1]2 : p1 = xa1 and p2 = (1− x)a2 , for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
}
depends on how the bargaining strength ai of each agent affects his own acceptance probability
in the eyes of the mediator. Given the product copula, the acceptance probabilities aggregate
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into the function xa1 · (1− x)a2 , and the corresponding recommendation is x∗1 = a1/(a1 + a2)
and x∗2 = a2/(a1 + a2). We recover the same solution set associated with the asymmetric
Nash solution.
From an interpretive viewpoint, we emphasise that the asymmetry associated with dif-
ferences in bargaining power affects the individual acceptance probabilities. The approach
described at the beginning of this section fails because it tries to impose the asymmetry on
the copula, that instead aggregates those into the joint probability of success. Although our
approach allows asymmetric copulas, they are not meant as a tool to capture modelling issues
concerning the native problem or its relation with the derived problem.
5.5 Negotiation analysis
This last section touches upon the relationships of our approach with the practice of negoti-
ations. When Roth (1979, Section I.B) writes that “a solution can be interpreted as a model
of the bargaining process”, he argues for considering its descriptive implications that can be
tested empirically. However, he points out that there is an alternative prescriptive approach
which views the solution as “a rule which tells an arbitrator what outcome to select”; e.g.,
Border and Segal (1997) aim to this second goal.
Our model is concerned with a mediator rather than an arbitrator: the latter can impose a
solution, while the former can only recommend it. This puts the mediator in a hybrid position.
Maximising the joint probability of success appears very natural, but its prescriptive value
for the mediator may not be shared by the agents who presumably worry about more than
just striking an agreement. This is not the place for a full discussion, but we wish to add a
few remarks to highlight the potential of our approach.
Subramanian (2010, pp. 109–110) finds “that the implications for negotiation strategy
change dramatically when we move away from the assumption that dealmakers will accept
deals that are just better than their BATNA [Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement,
equivalent to the disagreement point] to the more realistic and nuanced assumption that the
likelihood the other side will say yes increases with the incentives to do so.” The target-based
interpretation makes the role of individual acceptance probabilities explicit. The mediator
should acquaint herself with the agents well enough to understand how each of them views
the native bargaining problem and code her understanding in terms of individual acceptance
probability.
A second step requires the mediator to make a conscious choice about the possible con-
nections between the individual acceptance probabilities and the joint probability of success.
While the assumption of stochastic independence seems by far the simple and most natural
one, it is not the only possible one. Different copulas may rationalise alternative recommen-
dations, and thus this element should be given attention by the mediator.
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